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THE LAW ON ABRIDGMENT OF COPYRIGHTED
LITERARY MATERIAL
By HARRY W. ROBERTS, JR.*
In an effort to meet the modern demand for pre-digested
literary material, there has appeared a growing number of
digests and abridgements, each with circulations running into
millions. Most conspicuous of these is the Reader's Digest, which
boasts of a paid circulation of over four million readers. This
increased popularity of digests and abridgements has made the
legal aspect of such works important and a restatement of rights
of a copyright holder of a literary work in relation to an
abridger of such work seems advisable.
The present status of the law concerning abridgement is
uncertain. It not infrequently happens that when the founda-
tion of what is without hesitation taken or asserted as an estab-
lished legal principle is sought, it is found to be of no more
solid character than an accumulation of dicta made in the course
of a series of decisions relating to other branches of the same
general subject. There may be, in fact, not a single case in
which the precise point has arisen, and yet dicta on that point
have been so often, so broadly, and so confidently enunciated
that they bear the semblance of authority. Therefore, when a
case actually arises which calls for a direct and positive decision
upon the very question, the judicial mind, misled by appear-
ances, may yield to the supposed pressure of authority and feel
compelled to decide in accordance therewith, against the bent
of its inclination. It may not be without practical bearing, there-
fore, to examine the earliest expressions of the rule concerning
abridgements and trace its development in judicial thought.
In the Azoizymouzs Case' of 1774 Lord Chancellor Aspley,
after he had consulted Mir. Justice Blackstone, whose knowledge
and skill in his profession were universally known, held:
"That to constitute a true and proper abridgment of a work the
whole must be preserved in its sense; and then the act of abridgment
is an act of understanding, employed in carrying a large work into
a smaller compass, and rendering it less expensive, and more con-
venient both to the time and use of the reader. Which made an
abridgment in the nature of a new and a meritorious work ...
an abridgment, where the understanding is employed in retrenching
unnecessary and uninteresting circumstances, which rather deaden
* A.B., 1937, and M.A., 1938, Texas Christian University; LL.B.,
1941, University of Kentucky. Attorney, Clinton, Kentucky.
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the narration, is not an act of plagarism upon the original work, nor
against any property of the author in it, but an allowable and
meritorious work."2
If this principle, as enunciated here, is representative of
the law, it authorizes barefaced literary thefts. It would mean
that by merely omitting certain matter which the abridger con-
sidered as "unnecessary and uninteresting" the characters, the
plot, the language and the ideas of an author could be repub-
lished, interfering with the sales of and in competition with, the
original work. As such, it would be an infringement on the
copyright of the same.
The rule concerning abridgements was first stated by the
English court as dicta in Gyles v. Willcox, 3 in 1740, in which
case an injunction was granted on the ground that the work
complained of was a "merely colorable" shortening of the
original work. But, to prevent the decision from being con-
sidered as authority for more than was before the court, Lord
Hardwick, by way of dictum, said:
"Abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book,
because not only the paper and print, but the invention, learning,
and judgment of the author is shown in them, and in many cases are
extremely useful, though in some instances prejudicial, by mistaking
and curtailing the sense of the author."'
It is this dicta which is the foundation of the modern rule.
The question was again presented to the English Court in Dods-
ley v. Kinnersley,5 in 1761. The opinion indicates that the law
was not vigorously argued before the court, the plaintiff's con-
tention being that the abridgement did not do justice to the
original work. The court refused to issue the injunction on the
ground that the author himself had published an abridgement
of the original in a periodical and therefore was not injured by
this publication. The uncertainty and vagueness of the opinion
make it impossible to evolve any clear principle from the case,
Anonymous Case, supra n. 1, 914.
82 Atk. 141, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (1741).
Gyles v. Wilcox, supra n. 3, 490. This dictum was commented
on by Lord Campbell in 5 Lives of the Lord Chancellors (1846) 56.
1 .... I much question another rule he laid down with respect to
literary property, although it has not yet been upset." After
quoting from Gyles v. Wilcox, he continues, "Gyles v. Wilcock,
2 Atk. 142; and see Lofft. 775; 1 Bro. C.C. 451. I confess I do
not understand why an abridgment tending to injure the reputa-
tion, and to lessen the profits of the author, should not be con-
sidered an invasion of his property."
5 1 Amb. 403, 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (1761).
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but it is evident that the work complained of was little more
than a critical review, which is permissible.
The next case upon this point was the Anonymous Case6
(1774), before Chancelor Aspley, in which he refused the
injunction requested and so extended the law as to make any
"colorable shortening" a "just and fair" abridgement. The
soundness of the decision was questioned by Lord Kenyon in
Trusler v. Murray,7 in 1789, who, after classifying the publica-
tion in that case as a piracy, continued by saying that he and
Lord Bathurst had been of that opinion with respect to the
"Abridgement of Cook's Voyage Round the World," -which was
the subject of the controversy in the Anonymous Case.
If this rule, as expressed by Chancellor Aspley, was ever
the law of England, it was certainly overruled by Bohn v.
Bogue8 (1846), in which Bogue defended his publication as
an abridgment by saying, "Here and there an illustration really
illustrative occurs, and of all such I have, to a greater or less
extent, availed myself.'' The injunction was granted by Vice-
Chancellor Shadwell restraining the publication of the so-called
abridgment on the ground of infringement, pointing out that
this "substitute" might have a very material effect on the sale
of the original book,lO
I Supra n. 1.
"1 East 362 (1789).87 Lond. T.O.S. 277, 10 Jur. 420 (1846).
'Bohn v. Bogue, supra n. 8, 873: " .... he first of all throws
overboard as utterly worthless, as of no use whatever to anybody,-
of no interest whatever,-the greatest part of the work, and then,
feeling the value of what he was going to take, feeling that it
might be beneficial to him to take it, and at the same time running
down as much as possible the value of the thing, he uses this
language: 'Here and there an illustration really illustrative occurs,'
showing, by this act, that he thought the thing valuable, and
using words at the same time which tend to depreciate the
substance of the theft."
14 Bohn v. Bogue, supra n. 8, 874: "Now, I will take this case:
we all know that there has been a very valuable Greek Lexicon
published by Mr. Liddell and another friend of his at Oxford; no
person who published that Lexicon, omitting three or four words
at the end of each letter of the alphabet, could have done a work
of which it could be said that it might be taken as a substitute-
for nobody would take it as a substitute. But can it be doubted,
that it might have a very material effect in diminishing the price
of the first book? For though nobody would take it as a sub-
stitute, many people might not care about (that) so much, and
might take it cheaply for what it really did contain, which might
be more that (than) ninety-nine hundredths of the whole; and
yet it would in no manner be a "substitute .... "
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In Dickens v. Lee"' (1844), Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce
granted an injunction restraining a so-called abridgment of
Charles Dickens' "A Christmas Carol," saying:
"I am not aware that one man has the right to abridge the works
of another. On the other hand, I do not mean to say that there may
not be an abridgment which may be lawful, which may be protected;
but to say that one man has the right to abridge, and so publish
in an abridged form the work of another, without more, is going
much beyond my notion of what the law in this country is."'
In Tinsley v. Lacy'3 (1861), Vice-Chancellor Wood said:
"The court has gone far enough in that direction; and it is
difficult to acquiesce in the reason sometimes given, that the compiler
of an abridgment is a benefactor to mankind, by assisting in
diffusion of knowledge.'"
The Chancellor said that no analogy could be drawn between
an abridgment of a work and the lawful use which Shakes-
peare made of the writings of Boccacio. Counsel for the
defendant relied upon Whittingharn v. Wooler'5 (1817) as
authority supporting the publication of an abridgment, but the
court distinguished the Wittinglzam Case by pointing out that
in that case the works complained of were reviews, "consisting
of criticisms and extracts to serve as foundation for criticism,"
while in the case at bar the works complained of were
abridgments designed to substitute for the original work.
Of all the English cases in which the publication complained
of was defended on the ground that it was an abridgment, in
only one, the Anonymous Case,16 was that defense successful.
That case has been overruled by subsequent decisions, and the
test of abridgment used in it has been again and again rejected.
The only other case favorable to the propriety of abridgment is
Dodsley v. Kinnersley17 which was decided upon another point.
In all other cases the publication of the abridgment has been
-8 Jur. 183 (1844).
'2 Dickens v. Lee, supra n. 9, 184.
1 Hem. & M. 747; 2 New Rep. 438, 32 L.J. Ch. 535, 27 J.P.
676, 11 W.R. 876, 71 Eng. Rep. 327 (1863).
"'Tinsley v. Lacy, supra n. 11, 329.
"2 Swan. 428, 36 Eng. Rep. 679 (1817). Defendant had pub-
lished in two numbers of a periodical devoted to theatrical
criticism an article of some forty pages, in which were included
six or seven pages from a farce written by the plaintiff inter-
spersed with criticisms. The courts refused the injunction on the
basis of a critical review.
'
8 Supra n. 1.
"Supra n. 5.
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uniformly enjoined.' 8 However, in each of these cases the
court has praised a "just and proper abridgment" as a "new
and meritorious work." It was the "weight" of this
"authority" that bound Justice McLean in Story v. Holcombe'9
(1847) and thus established American precedent. His state-
ment was:
"If this were an open question, I should feel little difficulty in
determining it. An abridgment should contain an epitome of the
work abridged-the principles in the condensed form of an original
book. Now it would be difficult to maintain that such a work did
not affect the sale of the book abridged. The argument that the
abridgment is suited to a different class of readers by its cheapness
and will be purchased on that account by persons unable and
unwilling to purchase that work at large is not satisfactory. This, to
some extent, may be true, but are there not many who are able to
buy the original work who will be satisfied with the abridgment.
.... The reasoning on which the right to abridge is founded there-
fore seems to me to be false in fact. It does to some extent in all
cases, and not infrequently to a great extent, impair the rights of
the author-a right secured by law.... But a contrary doctrine
has been long established in England under the Statute of Anne,
which in this respect is similar to our own Statute, and in this
country the same doctrine has prevailed. I am, therefore, bound by
precedent, and I yield to it in this instance more as a principle of law
than a rule of reason or justice."'
"Read v. Hodges, cited in 2 Atk. 142, 26 Eng. Rep. 490 (1740);
Butterworth v. Robinson, 5 Ves. 709, 31 Eng. Rep. 817 (1801); Vesey
v. Sweet, 5 Ves. 709n, 31 Eng. Rep. 818 (1823); Bell v. Walker, 1 Bro.
C.C. 451, 28 Eng. Rep. 1235 (1785) (These cases, in addition to the
cases cited and discussed above, represent all the English cases upon
this subject). An interesting observation was made in D'Almaine
v. Bossey, 1 Y & C 288 (1835). The question before the court was
the right to make adaptations of music. Lord Lyndhurst observed
that it was a nice question, what should be deemed such a modifica-
tion of an original work as should absorb the merit of the original
in the new composition. "No doubt such a modification may be
allowed in some cases, as in that of an abridgment or a digest.
Such publications are in their nature original. Their compiler
intends to make of them a new use; not that which the author
proposed to make. Digests are of great use to practical men, though
not so, comparatively speaking, to a student. The same may be
said of an abridgment of any study; but it must be a bona fide
abridgment, because if it contains many chapters of the original
work, or such as made the work most saleable, the maker of the
abridgment commits a piracy. Now, it will be said that one author
may treat the same subject very differently from another who wrote
before him. That observation is true in many cases. A man may
write upon morals in a manner quite distinct from that of others
who preceded him, but the subject of music is to be regarded upon
very different principles. It is the air, a melody which is the in-
vention of the author, and which may in such case be the subject of
piracy. . . ." On subject of digests see, Sweet v. Benning, 16 C.B.
459 (1855).
11 4 McLean 308, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13, 497 (1847).
Story v. Holcombs, supra n. 19, 309.
KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
This precedent -which Justice McLean considered so binding
was the dicta of Gyles v. Willcox, the overruled Anonymaus
Case, and Dodsley v. Kinnersley, which was decided on another
point. However, an injunction was granted to a part of the
work complained of, and the statement of Justice McLean is in
itself dicta. The principle was restated as dicta in Lawrence v.
Dana21 (1869), citing Story v. Holcombe,22 Gayles v. WIlcox 23
Anonymous Case,24 and Dodsley v. Kinnersley.
25
This problem concerning abridgment and piracy was
handled very well by Circuit Justice Story in Gray v. Russell 26
(1839), where he considered it largely a question of fact, by
saying:
"... if large extracts are made therefrom in a review, it might
be a question, whether those extracts were designed bona fide for
the mere purpose of criticism, or were designed to supersede the
original work under the pretence of a review, by giving it substance
in a fugitive form. The same difficulty may arise in relation to an
abridgment of an original work. The question, in such a case, must
be compounded of various considerations; whether it be a bona fide
abridgment, or only an evasion by omission of some unimportant
parts; whether it will, in its present form prejudice or supersede the
original work; whether it will be adjudged to the same class of
readers; and many other considerations of the same sort, which
may enter as elements, in ascertaining whether there has been a
piracy or not. Although the doctrine is often laid down in the books,
that an abridgment is not a piracy of the original copyright; yet this
proposition must be received with many qualifications."'
14 Cliff 828, 14 Fed. Case No. 8, 136 (1869); "Whatever might be
thought, if the question were an open one, it is too late to agitate it
at the present time, as the rule is settled that the publication of an
unauthorized but bona Jlde abridgement or digest of a published
literary copyright, in a certain class of cases at least, is no infringe-
ment of the original." . . . "Unless it be denied that a legal copyright
secures to the author 'the sole right and liberty of printing, reprint-
ing, publishing, and binding the book' copyrighted, it cannot be held
that an abridgment or digest of any kind of the contents of the copy-
righted publication, which is of a character to supersede the original
work, is not an infringement of the franchise secured by the copy-
right. What constitutes a fair and bona fide abridgment in the sense
of law is, or may be, under particular circumstances, one of the most
difficult questions which can well arise for judicial consideration; but
it is well settled that a mere selection or different arrangement of
parts of the original work into a smaller compass will not be held
to be such an abridgment." In view of this statement consider the
reasoning of Chancellor Aspley in the anonymous case, supra n. 1.
Supra n. 19.
2Supra n. 3.
Supra n. 1.
2 Supra n. 5.
l10 Fed. Cas. 5, 728, 1 Story 11 (1839).
Gray v. Russell, supra n. 2.
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In 1911 the matter of abridgment was again presented to
the court by the publication of mere fragmentary and superficial
portrayal of plot and characters from various operas. The court
found that it was not an abridgment of the original, since it
gave just enough information to put the reader on inquiry, as
a syllabus of a law report, the review of a book, or a description
of a painting induces the reader to examine further. The in-
junction was accordingly denied.28
In the most recent case, MacMillan Co. v. King 29 (1914),
the defendant, a college professor, was enjoined from distribut-
ing mimeographed copies of parts of the plaintiff's original work
to his students in connection with classes in economics. This was
not a case of abridgment and the court based its decision upon
the Copyright Act of 1909, which secures to the owner of a
copyright in a literary work in exclusive right to print, reprint,
publish, copy, and vend the copyright work and to make any
other version thereof.30 It would seem that this act is no more
than a codification of the common law and that if it could be
possible to produce a true abridgment, that such would be a
"new and meritorious" work, and therefore, would not be
subject to this act. Thus, the copyright acts of England and of
the United States have no effect upon the status of the law of
abridgement.
Since 1774 the courts have been steadily retreating from the
definition of abridgment given in the Awonymous Case.3 1
They have found that the works complained of were either
reviews, and thus allowed, or were not bona fide abridgments,
and so enjoined. The statement as to what constitutes an
abridgment is to be found only in dicta and no case since the
Anonymous Case32 (1774) has held that a particular publication
is a bona fide abridgment. In each case the work complained of
has violated the property right in the original in some respect.
Although often stated, if such a rule ever existed, except in the
mind of Chancellor Aspley, it has never been applied. Indeed,
" Ricordi v. Mason, 201 Fed. 182 (1911).
"223 Fed. 862 (1914).
10 3 (Comp. St. 1913, sec. 9519); also see 17 U. S. C. A., sec. 6
(1909); for the English Act see 1-2 Geo. V., C. 46, S. 2, subsec. 6(1911).
Supra n. 1.
Supra n. 1
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some of the later cases have criticized not only the existence but
the reason for the rule of a bona fide abridgment. It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that it would be impossible to create a bona
fide abridgment which would not be an infringement on the
copyright of the original, in spite of the dicta to the contrary.
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